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Abstract
The Ghanaian private sector is mainly composed of 
small businesses. The sector is expected to propel the 
growth and development of the Ghanaian economy. 
Unfortunately, the key players in the sector, small 
businesses, are bedeviled with a multitude of problems 
majori ty  of  which have been lef t  to  the highly 
incapacitated private sector to handle. This paper argues, 
conceptually, for responsibility of the state in providing 
the required co-ordination externalities and big pushes 
that are indispensable to the development of the private 
sector and ability of the sector to truly act as the engine 
of growth and development of the economy. This is 
achieved through review of the importance of the small 
business sector to global and national economies; how the 
Ghanaian economy has performed under the dominance 
of the state and the private sector since independence; and 
shortcomings in state policy support for private sector 
development.
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INTRODUCTION
It is generally acknowledged that the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (herein referred to 
as small businesses or SMEs) vary across countries and 
regions. This notwithstanding, small businesses account 
for a greater percentage of all businesses in virtually 
every economy and generate the majority of private sector 
employment and output. For instance, the share of SMEs 
in the total number of enterprises stands at almost 100 
percent in Indonesia and 99.9 percent in Canada and the 
United States of America (APEC1 Policy Support Unit, 
2010).
Thus the private sector in most countries is largely 
dominated by small businesses majority of which are local 
enterprises. This is the sector that has become the motor 
of growth and development in virtually every economy 
and is inevitable in both national and global economic 
activity. For example, the private sector is recognised as 
key role player in the resolution of global imbalances in 
the world economy (“Annex: IMF2...”, 2006). Therefore, 
developing small businesses is, in effect, an upgrading of 
the private sector and its importance to national, regional 
and global economic growth and development. 
The importance of small businesses is manifest in 
contributions to wealth creation, employment generation 
and poverty reduction. Moreover, small enterprises have 
been associated with high levels of economic adaptability 
and flexibility, and are seen as creating economic 
opportunity through innovation (Carter & Van Auken, 
2006; Atherton, 2005) and regarded as the seedbed for 
industrialisation, especially in Africa (Siddiqi, 2006). 
In developed economies,  i t  is  est imated that 
SMEs account for an average of 67 percent of formal 
employment in the manufacturing sector and contribute a 
sizable share to formal Gross Domestic Product (GDP)–49 
1 APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
2 IMF: International Monetary Fund.
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percent on average in high-income countries (IFC3, 2010). 
For instance, as of 2006, in the European economy, SMEs 
contributed up to 60 percent of EU4- GDP and accounted 
for 99.8 percent of the total number of EU enterprises 
(UEAPME5, 2006). 
In developing economies, SMEs account for an 
average of 45 percent of formal employment in the 
manufacturing sector (IFC, 2010). Specifically, it is 
estimated that SMEs account for about 92 percent of 
businesses in Ghana (Abor & Quartey, 2010) and more 
than 70 and 90 percent of all registered businesses in 
Tanzania and Indonesia respectively (APEC Policy 
Support Unit, 2010; Confederation of Tanzania Industries, 
2009). 
Moreover, the contribution of SMEs to formal GDP in 
low-income countries is about 29 percent on average (IFC, 
2010) with some lower middle income countries, such 
as Ghana, recording higher contributions. For example, 
contribution of SMEs to GDP is estimated at 40 percent in 
Tanzania, 70 percent in Ghana, 75 percent in Uganda and 
97 percent in Indonesia (Abor & Quartey, 2010; APEC 
Policy Support Unit, 2010; Confederation of Tanzania 
Industries, 2009; Okello-Obura, Minishi-Majanja, Cloete 
& Ikoja-Odongo, 2008). 
Furthermore, several studies have found that SMEs 
create more jobs than large firms do, both in developing 
and developed countries. Net job creation is also higher 
in SMEs than in large firms (IFC, 2010). However, 
there is evidence that in developing economies, SMEs 
could contribute more to economic development than 
they currently do (IFC, 2010) if given the needed boost. 
In addition, because most small businesses are local 
enterprises, they have a greater capacity to fuel economic 
growth and development of a nation through the retention 
of wealth in the economy as against large foreign 
enterprises that usually repatriate profits to their home 
countries. 
The case of China is a good example of the economic 
importance of small businesses which are practically 
local enterprises. China has grown quickly over the past 
decade and has recently been a leader together with the 
USA in world economic growth (“Annex: Summing 
Up...”, 2005). This growth has largely come about from 
small enterprises, in particular Township and Village 
Enterprises, owned by local communities and partly 
controlled by local government (Gibb & Li, 2003). 
The valuable contributions of the small business 
sector to national and global economies have earned the 
sector a boost in most developed nations and international 
communities. Examples are the Small Business Service of 
the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union’s (EU) 
Green Paper on Entrepreneurship aimed at developing the 
sector to unleash its full potentials for economic growth 
and development. In Ghana, currently, national policy 
support programmes for the small business sector are 
mostly channelled through the National Board for Small 
Scale Industries (NBSSI) and its implementing agency, 
the Business Advisory Centres (BACs). 
In spite of the valuable contributions of the small 
business sector to Ghana’s economy, the sector is not 
delivering on its expectation as a key driver of growth 
and development. This paper aims at tracing the growing 
importance of the private sector (of which small 
businesses constitute a greater percentage) in Ghana’s 
economy since independence and the unparalleled support 
that the sector receives. The paper primarily reiterates a 
number of recent calls for countries, such as Ghana, to 
approach the development of the private sector with a 
focus on coordinated expansion of the domestic market 
through state planning and incentives. 
The paper is outlined into four sections, including the 
introduction. The next section provides an overview of the 
role of the state and the private sector in Ghana’s economy 
since independence. This is followed by an exposition of 
the role of the state in private sector development with a 
focus on highlighting important missing links for policy 
attention. The paper ends with a conclusion on key policy 
considerations for boosting activities of the Ghanaian 
private sector.
1.  THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN GHANA’S 
ECONOMY SINCE 1957
Between 1957 and 1980, statism dominated the economic 
policy front of Ghana. Statism was chosen for several 
reasons. Prominent among them was the conviction that 
the state was at the time, the best option for the huge 
investments in economic projects that the economy 
required, particularly, at independence in 1957. This was 
because these projects were “considered too risky and 
complex for what was essentially a highly underdeveloped 
and unsophisticated private sector” (Mbaku, 2003, p. 
217). 
Other reasons for the choice of statism over active 
private sector participation were the need to generate 
wealth, fight poverty and to provide the people with 
employment opportunities. The economy, at independence 
in most of Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), was one of mass 
poverty deprivations worsened by spatial inequalities. The 
concern of development, in that era, was the “eradication 
3 International Finance Co-operation.
4 EU: European Union.
5 UEAPME: Union Européene de L’Artisanat et des Petites et. 
Moyennes Entreprises/European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.
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of colonially created core-periphery spatial differences 
that had engendered spatial inequity and inefficiency” 
(Yeboah, 2006) and the need to reconstruct and 
rehabilitate societies that had been devastated by colonial 
exploitation (Mbaku, 2003). 
The Ghanaian public sector, therefore, became 
the main engine of economic activities and growth 
and for that matter for striving towards governments’ 
goal of large-scale industrial development, which had 
import substitution industrialisation strategy at its core. 
Governments under Nkrumah, Busia and Supreme 
Military Council regimes embarked on massive state 
investments in public projects such as the Tema industrial 
city and the Akosombo Dam (Yeboah, 2006). Other 
major investments were the establishment of processing 
plants such as the Ghana Food Company (GAFCO), the 
Bolgatanga Meat Factory, and the Ghana Textiles Printing 
(GTP) Company. 
The results of statism with redistributive economic 
policies at its core were twofold. Positive results were 
felt in the life of the ordinary person who benefited from 
the redistributive policy of governments. In the early 
1960s, Ghana had the highest level of GDP per capita in 
Sub-Sahara Africa (Tettey, Puplampu & Berman, 2003), 
stood almost at par in economic terms with countries 
such as South Korea and Malaysia (Codjoe, 2003), but 
unfortunately slipped away from being classified as 
a middle income country by the World Bank (Tettey, 
Puplampu & Berman, 2003; Killick, as cited in Aryeetey 
& Fosu, n.d). 
Thus the positive economic turnaround was short-
lived and soon gave way to a declining economy from the 
late 1960s. This has been highly blamed, at the formal 
discussion front, on the politicisation of resources by 
governments, debt-financing strategy, and high managerial 
inefficiencies in the public sector - the custodian of 
industrial activities at the time (Mbaku, 2003) with 
adverse features of corruption, nepotism and rent seeking. 
However, all the while, the private sector had been 
neglected in terms of developing it to become part of the 
economic development process in Ghana. With economic 
activities vastly in the hands of highly subsidised and 
inefficient State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), growth in 
the Ghanaian economy declined with worse and turbulent 
records in real GDP and GDP per capita growth between 
1971 and 1984 (with exceptional positive growths in 1973 
and 1978). For instance, growths in real GDP and real per 
capita GDP stood at approximately -3 and -6 percent in 
1972, -13 and -17 percent in 1975 and -7 and -10 in 1982 
respectively (McKay & Aryeetey, 2004). 
In addition, Ghana’s foreign reserves dwindled and 
the nation’s debt rose. Real wages kept dropping, while 
public sector and industrial earnings also kept falling. By 
the 1980s, the rate of inflation in Ghana was estimated to 
be over 100 percent and per capita GDP had fallen from 
its 1960 levels of $1009 to $739 with national poverty 
incidence level rising to 37 percent in 1988 (see Takyi & 
Addai, 2003). 
The deteriorating economic situation in Ghana 
prompted the Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank 
and the IMF at its forefront) in the early 1980s to institute 
conditions attached to borrowing for reforms in Ghana. As 
Yeboah (2006, p. 50) describes it, “because of increasing 
national debt, the collapse of the Ghanaian economy, and 
the vampire state in Ghana”, the then government under 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime 
had no alternative but to rely upon global sources of 
capital to finance Ghana’s development. This was a major 
turning point in Ghana’s economic policies, as it had 
since the 1980s taken a much external orientation with 
some writers such as Yeboah (2006, p. 50ff.) describing 
Ghana’s development as “being coached within the notion 
of development funds”. 
By 1982, Ghana’s real GDP had declined to -7 percent 
(McKay & Aryeetey, 2004) and inflation was as high as 
123 percent in 1983 (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997) while, at the 
same time, terms of trade had deteriorated and the nation’s 
accounts recorded large fiscal imbalances. The industrial 
sector was in total shambles with the collapse of the 
manufacturing sector during the severe economic crisis 
of the early 1980s. In fact, previous governments relied 
on import of machinery and spare parts for the industrial 
sector without instituting measures for the production of, 
at least needed, components that could be produced within 
Ghana. 
Between April 1983 and December 2000, Ghana 
implemented the World Bank/IMF recommended 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) Phase I, Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), and the Programme 
of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD) to restore the economy back on track. 
The objectives of the ERP included improvements in 
debt repayment, restoration of the nation’s international 
creditworthiness, and attracting foreign capital to 
rehabilitate infrastructure. The ERP and SAP had at 
their core increased extraction of raw materials with 
emphasis on the development of infrastructure for 
improved extraction of gold, timber, and cocoa for export 
(Yeboah, 2006). Moreover, currency devaluation, trade 
liberalisation, reduction in public sector employment 
with associated retrenchment of labour, limited state 
involvement in the economy and privatisation of SOEs 
are some of the policies that were implemented under the 
SAP. 
One of the most cited advantages of the SAP is that 
privatisation of SOEs, which began with the passing of 
privatisation law in 1993, brought the country, during the 
1990s, revenues valued at 21.6 percent of the nation’s 
GDP. This enabled Ghana to reduce its outstanding IMF 
obligations as percentage of GDP from 12.7 percent in 
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1990 to 4.0 percent by 1999 (Brune, Garrett & Kogut, 
2004). In addition, the Ghanaian economy recorded 
consistent increases in GDP within the period 1984-2000 
with an average of 4.7 percent (McKay & Aryeetey, 2004). 
However, the SAP brought considerable hardships 
on the general populace which necessitated another 
strategy of poverty reduction under the PAMSCAD. 
Reforms which started in 1983 could not arrest in a 
sustainable way, within the short to medium term, the 
falling Ghanaian economy such that in 1990 economic 
growth had stalled. Agricultural and manufacturing 
outputs drastically fell in the 1990s. For instance, in 1990, 
food processing and textile manufacturing were less than 
60 percent of their volumes in 1977. This, among other 
factors, saw the increase in official development assistance 
(ODA) to Ghana (McKay & Aryeetey, 2004). Similarly, in 
1998, manufacturing output for all industries was below the 
1970s level while in 1999 export in cocoa (the country’s 
leading export commodity) fell by 40 percent (Yusuf & 
Saffu, 2005). Average annual rate of inflation rose from 25 
percent in 1989 to 37.7 percent in 1990 and fell again to a 
low of 15 percent in 1991-2 (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997). 
Moreover, the share of private investments in the 
economy continued to be very low – after an initial 
increase from 2 percent in 1982 to 4.4 percent in 1984, 
it stood at a low of 3 percent by 1992 (Gyimah-Boadi, 
1997). Furthermore, Ghana’s debt rose. As Gyimah-Boadi 
(1997, p. 311) vividly puts it “…Ghana did not enter the 
ERP/SAP with a debt problem, but it came to have one”. 
The country’s total foreign debt rose from 1.6 billion in 
1980 to 3.6 billion in 1988 while debt service rations was 
on the average over 50 percent to a high of 75 per cent in 
1988 (Whitfield & Jones, 2007). In effect, cost of living 
continued to rise for the populace with no significant 
reductions in poverty; national poverty incidence level 
stood at 51.7 percent in 1991/2 (Osei, 2012). It is 
important to note that the deteriorating economic situation 
in Ghana was exacerbated by a fall in world commodity 
prices. For example, in 1999 alone, the price of gold (one 
of Ghana’s main export commodities) declined by 13 
percent (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997).
In recent times, Ghana’s economic policy continues 
to be highly directed by its agriculture-based economy, 
although the service sector has, since 2008, taken over 
agriculture as highest contributor to GDP6. A turning 
point is that the role of the private sector is becoming 
increasingly prominent in achieving growth targets spelt 
under Ghana’s long term development plan, Vision 2020 
submitted to Parliament in 1995. Vision 2020 targets an 
average economic growth of 8 percent per annum through 
a strategy of human capital development, improved 
macro-economic policies, diversification of the economy, 
the creation of a business friendly environment, and trade 
openness. To drive the nation towards the attainment of 
targets set under Vision 2020 are national policies such as 
the National Medium Term Private Sector Development 
Strategy (NMTPSDS 2004-2008) and the growth and 
poverty reduction strategy I and II, and the Ghana Micro, 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (MSME) project. 
With the private sector as the main engine for growth, 
Ghana entered the twenty-first century with low economic 
performance. The period 2003-2008 recorded inconsistent 
real GDP growth rates from a low of 5.1 percent in 2003 
to 8.4 percent in 2008. The year 2009 recorded a massive 
decline in real GDP (stood at 4.4 percent) (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). This was possibly due to the 
financial crisis that hit the world economy and slower 
economic activity resulting from a change in government 
early that year. However, the impact of the crisis on the 
Ghanaian economy, and most countries in Sub-Sahara 
Africa, was not that intense and long lasting because of 
their limited integration into global manufacturing and 
financial networks (International Monetary Fund, 2011). 
Moreover, the last wave of the Ghana Living Standards 
Survey (GLSS V) has the proportion of Ghanaian 
households described as poor to be 28.5 percent in 2005⁄6, 
although inequality and underemployment have worsened 
(Osei, 2012; see also Annim, Mariwah & Sebu, 2012). 
In addition, larger regional disparities exist with poverty 
incidence in some areas above 85 percent (Ofori, 2011). 
Export of goods and services as a percent of GDP has not 
seen steady growth – exports fell from 42.4 percent in 
2002 to 36.1 percent in 2005 and went up in 2006 to 38.2 
percent. Investments as a percentage of GDP, however, 
rose to 29.1 percent in 2006 from 19.7 percent in 2002 
(International Monetary Fund, 2007). 
On a more positive note, the country’s external debt 
to official creditors steadily decreased to a low of 7.7 
percent in 2006 from a high of 117.7 percent in 2002. This 
dramatic reduction in external debt is highly explained by 
debt relief awarded in 2002 under the enhanced Highly 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative when Ghana 
reached a decision point to qualify for debt relief. More 
so, increase in investment is partly attributed to increase in 
public spending (government expenditure highly financed 
from aid) as spelt out in Ghana’s Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy II (National Development Planning 
Commission, 2006) and directed by conditionalities under 
the HIPC initiative. 
Since 2011, Ghana is classified as a lower middle 
income country. This new and welcoming status was 
mainly driven by the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities in 2008 and export since 2010. Consequently, 
real GDP rose from 7.7 percent in 2010 to 14.4 percent 
6 See http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&DIMENSIONS=90
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boosted by oil production and a rebounded construction 
sector (International Monetary Fund, 2011; The World 
Bank, 2012). However, current account deficit widened 
by 38 percent in 2011 mainly fuelled by increases in 
nonoil imports volumes and services and income outflows 
while external debt increased by 7.2 percent and stood 
at 19.9 percent of GDP. On a positive note, export 
receipts increased by 61 percent due mainly to increased 
production of cocoa and oil exports, in the same year. 
However, GDP is expected to decelerate to 7.5 percent 
in 2012 as oil production reaches its plateau (The World 
Bank, 2012). 
From the preceding discussion, the performance of 
the Ghanaian economy under the dominance of the public 
sector, mainly driven by SOEs from 1957 to 1990, can 
be described as uneven and unimpressive in most part. 
Standard of living was relatively poor for most Ghanaians. 
However, from 1990 to date, with the private sector as 
the main engine for growth, the country has seen some 
consistent (though not substantial in most cases) increase 
in GDP and decrease in national poverty incidence level. 
This notwithstanding, unemployment remains a challenge 
especially, rising graduate unemployment. The needed 
growth in private investments to propel and sustain 
significant growth into the future is still lacking. Level 
of investment as well as efficiency of investment is low. 
There remains a lot that the state can and must do to 
ensure that the private sector delivers on its mandate as 
the driving pillar of the economy.
2 .   THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN 
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
The Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS) Phase 
I (2005-2009) and Phase II (2010-2015) and the Ghana 
National Industrial Policy are two national strategic 
documents that describe government’s commitment to 
develop Ghana’s private sector. The two policy documents 
are interrelated in that the Ghana National Industrial 
Policy derives its strategic thrust from the PSDS I and II. 
The purpose of PSDS II is to develop a thriving 
private sector that creates jobs and enhances livelihoods 
for all. This is to be achieved by creating a more business-
friendly investment climate, and economic transformation. 
Specific interventions include reducing the costs and 
risks of doing business; reducing infrastructure deficit, 
developing an efficient financial sector that increases 
private sector access to affordable credit and innovative 
products. The Ghana National Industrial Policy, on the 
other hand, aims at expanding productive employment 
and technological capacity in the manufacturing sector, 
and promoting agro-based industrial development and 
spatial distribution of industries. Small businesses are the 
focal point of the government’s efforts to spur growth and 
reduce poverty. 
With the conviction that lack of finance is the major 
constraint to SME development in the country, the 
promotion of SME activities has largely centred on 
enhancing SMEs’ access to finance. The PSDS I had as 
one of its strategic core, enhancing access of enterprises 
to market. However, recent studies indicate that market 
access for enterprises and access to business information, 
technology and other business-related services are still a 
problem for Ghanaian enterprises (Mensah, 2012; Kufour, 
2008; Kayanula & Quartey, 2000). Resolving these 
problems will transform the enterprises into credit worthy 
entities that will enhance their access to credit. Besides, 
the nation needs to continue to work at improving SMEs’ 
access to market and technology to ensure that enterprises 
are well prepared to capitalise on the provisions under the 
PSDS II. 
In line with these, investment-led growth is what 
Ghana needs to boost and sustain its development. 
However, record shows that Ghana has been stagnating 
around the mid twenties in terms of total investment as a 
percentage of GDP; 1997-2001 average: 24 percent; 2002-
2006 average: 26 percent (International Monetary Fund, 
2007). This proves the need for increased investment 
in the economy for “There will only be sustainable 
development ... if the increase in government aid flows 
is complemented by a resurgence of enterprise” (Ending 
Africa’s Poverty, 2004, p.176). 
Growth can be spurred by significant and sustainable 
increases in productive public sector and private sector 
investments. In the case of Ghana, the private sector 
accounts for a greater percentage of investments in recent 
times. For instance, the ratio of private investment to that 
of central government as a percent of GDP were 21.6: 0.0 
percent in 2006, 16.6:3.5 percent in 2007, 17.9:1.7 percent 
in 2009, and estimated at 18.7:1.8 in 2011 (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). The state’s dual role as pioneer of 
development and promoter of an enabling environment 
for private sector development should, therefore, be 
geared towards identifying priorities for the development 
of the private sector and, for that matter, small businesses 
(Mbire-Banrungi, 2004). 
Similarly, Jackson (2004) stresses the need for 
effective government support for the private sector and 
provides a picture of the dilemma that many African 
countries, including Ghana, face: “The public sector and 
the state owned enterprises in ... Sub-Saharan Africa 
specifically have been widely criticised as being too 
large, bureaucratic and change resistant. There is broad 
agreement concerning the poor performance of the public 
sector … Yet there is little empirical evidence to suggest 
that private sector organisations are any better equipped to 
meet the challenges of change and development in Africa” 
(Jackson, 2004, p.23). Consequently, there is the need for 
change and entrepreneurial behaviour from all public and 
private sector stakeholders (Gibb & Li, 2003). 
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In order to nurture and realise the full potentials 
and benefits of the Ghanaian private sector, which 
is predominantly made up of small businesses, it is 
imperative to create an enabling business climate that will 
support the sector to flourish and boost wealth creation. 
This is what Siddiqi (2006, p.14) describes as the “best 
poverty attack”. Fortunately, the state has, in recent times, 
made considerable progress in improving the Ghanaian 
investment climate. 
This notwithstanding, the Ghanaian economy is 
not doing well under the dominance of the private 
sector. With over 90 percent of all registered Ghanaian 
businesses being SMEs (Abor & Quartey, 2010), whose 
operations are highly limited to the “small” Ghanaian 
market coupled with less substantial FDIs (Osei, 2012), 
the market system is not able to generate by itself the 
needed coordination externalities that are so crucial for 
the effective functioning of the economy. 
The state, therefore, remains the key organ for 
creating the market system that coordinates effectively 
and efficiently to bring about the needed externalities 
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1984 as cited in Asche, 2006). 
These coordination externalities basically include 
pecuniary external economies, and technological external 
economies. Pecuniary external economies come about 
through coexistence and functioning of different industries 
that complement each other to yield economies of scale. 
This is what Porter (1990, as cited in Daniels, Radebaugh 
& Sullivan, 2007) describes as “related and supporting 
industries”, one of the four key country and firm-specific 
elements that interact to determine the success of a nation 
in a particular industry and success internationally. 
However, the market may be so small - as is the case 
of Ghana - that it may fail to support the existence of 
these industries to bring about the expected benefits. 
Practically, private enterprises may not be interested in 
investing in such support industries due to anticipated 
poor returns on the huge investment required to provide 
the services. However, these support services are so 
crucial to the development of any industry such that once 
underdeveloped, the industry also remains undeveloped 
and unable to function well. In such an instance, the 
state must act to create the necessary platform for the 
emergence of critical support industries. As Asche (2006, 
p. 24) reiterates, “in spite of the fact that conditions for 
export-oriented growth were much better for the East 
Asian Newly Industrialising Economies than for African 
countries today, coordinated expansion of the domestic 
market through state planning and incentives was 
essential.”
This appears to be the missing link for the Ghanaian 
economy. Most of the policy initiatives outlined in the 
Ghana National Industrial Policy, for example, place 
the onus of creating support industries in the hands of 
the private sector. The catchy phrase: “government will 
encourage...institutions” leaves much to be desired. The 
Ghanaian situation is one that inevitably requires the 
state, in most instances, to act and provide the needed 
externalities. 
Equally important are technological external 
economies which emanate from the existence of 
technological capabilities developed through vocational 
training, on-the-job training and the formation of human 
capital needed to support industry. They also arise from 
networking/business linkages among industries. Even, 
in this case, the government is seen as a central actor in 
the creation of such external economies (Nurkse, 1953 as 
cited in Asche, 2006). 
In Ghana’s National Industrial Policy, the government 
makes selective commitment towards developing 
technical skills in the oil and gas industry, although the 
policy broadly aims at developing the technological 
capacity of the manufacturing sector. Responsibility for 
the latter is placed in the hands of the private sector with 
the government promising to encourage the sector towards 
the provision of the needed capacity. 
A major challenge for developing technological 
external economies is that demand for the ensuing skills 
and expertise (if export is not the primary goal) must be 
present locally to justify and direct any investment thereof. 
Development of pecuniary external economies, therefore, 
becomes crucial in propelling the growth and development 
of key industries in the economy to provide the necessary 
direction for the development of technological external 
economies. However, in the case of Ghana, these are not 
well-developed and the private sector is currently not in 
the right state to provide these externalities. Accordingly, 
the state must act. 
The inevitability of coordination externalities has been 
stressed in growth literature as a form of big push which 
governments can offer to their economies to bring them 
out of the so-called poverty trap. Rodrik (1995, as cited 
in Asche, 2006, p.24) draws two critical claims from 
earlier works that associate Taiwan’s and South Korea’s 
economic breakthroughs with this kind of big push: “… (1) 
both countries were ready for economic take-off by the 
early to mid-1960s, but economic growth was blocked by 
a coordination failure; (2) governments in both countries 
were able to undertake the measures needed to override 
this coordination failure.” 
Moreover, big pushes can take the form of (a) 
incentives, (b) protective mechanisms, and (c) creation 
of public enterprises that take up core investments when 
neglected by the private sector. These were much used 
during the planning euphoria from the 1940s to 1960s 
(Asche, 2006). It is imperative that the state spearheads 
the provision of the needed coordination externalities 
and the necessary big pushes to ensure that they are 
well developed for private sector activities to thrive and 
flourish. 
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As noted earlier, in the 1960s, Ghana had the highest 
level of GDP per capita in Sub-Sahara Africa (Tettey, 
Puplampu & Berman, 2003), stood almost at par in 
economic terms with countries such as South Korea and 
Malaysia (Codjoe, 2003), but unfortunately slipped away 
from attaining a middle income country status (Tettey, 
Puplampu & Berman, 2003; Killick, as cited in Aryeetey 
& Fosu, n.d.). 
It has taken over fifty years for Ghana to rise again 
not to the level of its 1960 contemporaries but as a 
lower middle income country that still struggles with 
poverty and income disparities. The big pushes which 
its contemporaries received in the 1960s still remain 
relevant and a must for fuelling and sustaining the new 
growth which the country is currently experiencing. This 
is highly indispensable for the realisation of the desired 
development and poverty reduction. Otherwise, the 
current growth (which is largely fuelled by revenues from 
oil export) will be short-lived.
CONCLUSION
The relevance of the Ghanaian small business sector 
(which constitutes a greater percentage of the private 
sector) and its strategic role as the key engine for the 
country’s growth and development is well acknowledged. 
However, as a sector that had been relegated to the 
background for nearly 30 years after independence and 
still suffers from poor access to technology, market, 
finance and particularly co-ordination failure, it is 
imperative that it receives the required state support to 
deliver on its mandate. The state has the unflinching 
responsibility to spearhead the provision of the needed 
coordination externalities and the necessary big pushes 
for private sector development for the growth and 
development of the Ghanaian economy.
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